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ABSTRACT. 
This article aims at briefly surveying the evidence of outsourcing, considering its impact 
on the labour market in advanced economies. On the base of the process definition, a 
tentative assessment of the overall impact of trade with low wage economies is 
proposed and after that the article addresses two policy-related issues: through which 
channels does trade with low wage countries (according to a broad definition of 
outsourcing) impact the labour market? And what are ultimately the patterns of 
international specialisation after outsourcing has taken place? 
The three conclusions are that outsourcing is the clue to understand the observed 
changes in labour demand; that product upgrading, and reshaping of production 
processes on an extended European basis, has preserved European competitiveness; 
and that top range varieties produced at low cost thanks to outsourcing have been key 
to such competitiveness. 
 
KEY WORDS: Offshoring, outsourcing, relocalization, labour market, European 
Union. 
 
JEL CLASIFICATION: F14, J23, L6. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
*
 Text of the Conference given in Madrid, October 2008. 
Lionel Fontagné. Outsourcing, competitiveness and the labour market: losers and winners. 
Papeles de Europa 
18 (2009): 35-49 36 
INTRODUCTION. 
There is growing concern in Europe regarding outsourcing, and the related fears will 
certainly be reinforced by the ongoing industrial turmoil driven by the recession. 
Accordingly, industrial outsourcing is a key issue for policy makers and it should not 
come as a surprise to have European governments heavily subsidising industry in 2009 
to avoid profound restructuring.  
Outsourcing of activities is often perceived by the civil society as the outcome of unfair 
competition at the international level, with emerging competitors offering more attractive 
social, environmental, or even attractive tax conditions for firms seeking low cost 
locations. 
This is not only a European concern. In 1990 the Japanese industry had 15 millions 
employees in Japan and 1.2 millions abroad. A decade later, industrial employment in 
Japan had lost 2 millions jobs, while 1.6 additional jobs had been created in foreign 
affiliates of Japanese firms. Even if the two figures – employment at home and abroad in 
multinationals – cannot directly be compared, it is difficult to convince policy makers that 
there is no issue here. Similar figures could be provided for the US economy. 
The specific phenomenon of outsourcing takes place in a more general framework 
where emerging exporters are the main contributors to international trade growth. Since 
these countries are characterised by very different factor endowments and income per 
capita, what is expected is specialisation, inter-industry trade and the associated 
adjustment costs. This come back of specialisation as an engine of growth of world 
trade is accordingly contrasting with the observed two-way trade in industrial products 
among developed economies, a pattern of the last three decades that had been 
exacerbated in Europe.  
What are the main drivers of the observed evolution? The first driver is international 
specialisation: the comparative advantage of high income countries is moving from 
industry to services. This is what could be coined as the Nike model, where firms in the 
manufacturing sector survive or prosper by focusing their activity on services 
(conception, branding, distribution,…). More generally, the breakdown of the value 
added chain is a core strategy of multinational firms: this leads to a profound reshaping 
of their locations at the world level. In certain industries, where transport costs for 
intermediate goods, components, parts are expensive, a regional factory is emerging, as 
exemplified by the division of labour in the car industry: this could be coined as the 
Cayenne model, referring to the successful strategy of Porsche. In other industries, what 
is key is hi-tech innovation and branding: the right competitive mix is then the 
association of top research and development with low cost assembly lines: this is the 
IPod model. All in all, the new industrial models promote jobs associated with innovation 
and organisation ... at the expense of blue collar and bottom white collar workers 
(Maurin, Thesmar & Thoenig, 2003) 
Ultimately, will the emerging new international division of labour lead to a situation 
where manufacturing industry collapses in countries such as Spain or France? 
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Considering the very pessimistic perception of the civil society, as regularly reflected in 
polls, there would be no way of keeping industrial jobs in Europe. On the contrary, 
economists are less alarming: costs indeed matter, but there are also other 
determinants of location, such as the quality of infrastructures and institutions, the 
market access, the availability of skilled labour etc. Incidentally, the competitiveness of 
European firms actually increases with outsourcing and one may expect that 
outsourcing is a means of keeping activity at home. And when it comes to the impact of 
outsourcing on the labour market, there is good evidence that unemployment is firstly 
due to domestic policies (as exemplified by the comparison of the UK and Germany in 
the late 90s), while outsourcing accounts for a negligible share of the turnover on the 
labour market. This broad consensus among economists has emerged in a rather 
chaotic way, with recurrent controversies and a shift of the perception from the benign 
neglect to a quite precise assessment of the actual impact of outsourcing on the 
observed changes in inequalities between white and blue collar workers. No need to 
recall here the debates between Krugman and Lawrence (1994) and Leamer (1998), or 
between Samuelson (2004) and  Bhagwati et al. (2004).  
This talk aims at briefly surveying the evidence of outsourcing, considering its impact on 
the labour market in advanced economies. A definition of the phenomenon is tentatively 
provided in the second section. A tentative assessment of the overall impact of trade 
with low wage economies is proposed in section 3. This talk then addresses two policy-
related issues in sections 4 and 5: through which channels does trade with low wage 
countries (according to a broad definition of outsourcing) impact the labour market ? And 
what are ultimately the patterns of international specialisation after outsourcing has 
taken place ? 
Our three conclusions are (1) that outsourcing is the clue to understand the observed 
changes in labour demand; (2) that product up grading, and reshaping of production 
processes on an extended European basis, has preserved European competitiveness; 
and (3) that top range varieties produced at low cost thanks to outsourcing have been 
key to such competitiveness. 
1. DEFINITION AND STATISTICAL SOURCES. 
Providing a definition of international (or “offshore”) outsourcing precise enough to 
derive a statistical measurement is uneasy. One commonly starts by considering two 
different issues: (1) “make” or “buy” (2) “at home” or “abroad”. This leads to four different 
cases, corresponding to an integrated process (make at home), traditional sub-
contracting (buy at home), offshoring (make abroad), and finally to outsourcing (buy 
abroad). Indeed, such taxonomy hardly addresses the complex reality of outsourcing: for 
instance, when a plant is shifted abroad in a low cost country, this offshoring is also an 
outsourcing.  
Accordingly, one should consider two alternative definitions. Firstly, and strictly 
speaking, the relocation of a factory abroad (first close factory at home, then open 
abroad), leading to import its output or to displace previous domestic exports is an 
outsourcing. Less strictly speaking, any decision to locate part of the production process 
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abroad, in low wage countries is an outsourcing. Even more loosely, importing from low 
wage countries is a convenient statistical upper cap of outsourcing. 
However, none of theses definitions can answer the following questions: when the 
Spanish car producer SEAT, a German affiliate, purchases screws in China instead of 
Spain is it outsourcing? When Spanish subsidiary  of the French wholesaler Carrefour 
purchases shirts in Vietnam instead of Spain is it outsourcing? When SEAT loses 
market shares to the benefit of the Logan assembled by Renault (also a Spanish 
producer) in its Romanian affiliate is it outsourcing or simply competition? 
Accordingly, one must be rather pragmatic when choosing a definition and measuring 
the phenomenon. And indeed, available data hardly addresses outsourcing. Input-
Output tables can be used to measure imported intermediate consumption or imported 
intra-consumption. But the level of detail of this tables is low (at most 100 industries), 
and the assumption made to compute the shares we are interested in are questionable. 
Lastly, these tables are hardly updated on a regular basis. Alternatively, detailed trade 
data, using a detailed classification, can be combined with the BEC (Broad Economic 
Categories classification of the UN). But here there is no means of assessing the 
indirect use of intermediate inputs, contrary to the Input Output tables. Ideally, individual 
firm data would be the best source of information: but there is restricted access and this 
data cannot be compared form one country to another. Surveys can also be used, but 
here again, these are limited to a certain number of countries, and are not performed 
systematically over time. In the future, FATS (Foreign Affiliate Trade Statistics) will 
hopefully provide additional evidence, but their collection has started only recently.  
Figure 1: Share of intermediate goods in manufactured imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Comext, Fontagné and Gaulier (2008), p.35 
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Using input-output tables there has been repeated and converging evidence from early 
works (Fontagné, 1991), to more recent ones (Hummels et al. 2001). On the contrary, 
detailed trade statistics provide a more contrasted picture. Even if the share of 
intermediate goods in world trade tends to increase, there is no systematic evidence of 
such pattern at the importing country level. For instance, within the EU, the situation 
observed in Germany is actually a peculiar one. We can observe in Figure 1 the sharp 
contrast between Germany and the UK in terms of the share of intermediate inputs in 
total manufactured imports. The contrast is also striking with Spain or France: clearly, 
German producers have been increasingly relying on outsourcing of parts and 
components to boost their competitiveness, while Spain or France have less relied on 
this strategy, in particular the two (high cost) latter countries have remain quite 
integrated in industrial terms over the period considered. In Figure, 2, we can easily 
check that the share of low wage countries in intermediate imports is much larger in 
Germany (and Italy), even it increases everywhere. 
 
Figure 2: Share of low-wage countries in intermediate imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Comext, Fontagné and Gaulier (2008), p.35 
 
2. IMPACT OF TRADE WITH LOW WAGE COUNTRIES ON THE 
LABOUR MARKET. 
Before measuring what may have been the impact of outsourcing on the labour market, 
it is worth clarifying how do trade, employment and productivity interact in an open 
economy setting. Actually, productivity and trade have to be considered jointly. Changes 
in manufacturing employment can be decomposed in changes due to productivity, 
changes due to net trade, and changes due to domestic demand. And changes in net 
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trade can be decomposed in net trade with high income countries and respectively with 
low wage countries. 
Since productivity gains are larger in industry than in services, the relative decline in the 
price of manufactured goods should boost the demand for these goods, at least partially 
compensating the low income elasticity of demand for manufactured products. But this 
relative decline may be reinforced by the increasing share of trade with low wage 
economies. In total, the percentage share in manufacturing employment is the weighted 
average of three components: (1) the difference between the changes in demand and 
productivity; (2) the difference between the  changes in export and minus productivity; 
(3) the difference between the  changes in imports and productivity. Thus, if the value 
added due to exports increases at a slower pace than productivity, it may well be the 
case that exports contribute negatively to manufacturing employment. On the contrary, if 
the share of imports in production increases less rapidly than productivity, we may 
observe a positive contribution of imports to domestic manufacturing employment. And 
since productivity increases very fast in import competing sectors, for a given level of 
imports the number of displaced jobs should go down over time. However created and 
displaced jobs are different and such simple accounting is indeed hiding such 
differentiated impacts across categories of workers. 
Based on this simple accounting framework, Baily and Lawrence (2005) propose an 
accounting exercise relying on the US Input Output table. The question is what was the 
role of trade in the massive US manufacturing job loss after 2000? 
 
Figure 3: Path of US manufacturing employment (1992-2005), thousand of workers, 
seasonally adjusted). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baily and Lawrence estimate separately the impact of imports and exports on the 
decline of manufacturing employment over 2000-2003. They use a simple input-output 
method authorising to compute the direct and indirect labour content based on the 
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apparent productivity of labour in industries. Based on such methodology, they find that 
89% of the 2.9 million jobs manufacturing employment fall over the period was the result 
of weak domestic demand with strong productivity growth. Only 11 % was due to trade. 
As for trade, the induced loss of jobs was the result of export weakness. Export 
weakness was due to an over-evaluated dollar. They conclude that trade displaced a lot 
of manufacturing jobs but accounted for very little job loss over 2000-03.  
However, three assumptions must be made to perform such calculation: (1) balanced 
trade within industries (Intra-Industry Trade) does not impact the labour market; (2) 
displaced and actual production have similar production functions; and (3) productivity is 
not driven by trade. These assumptions are highly questionable.  
Firstly, trade within industries might impact employment through two channels: a vertical 
differentiation channel, where imported and exported products correspond to different 
production functions and skilled/unskilled bundles; a competitive channel, where imports 
lead to a rationalisation of production and thus will change the nature of competition on 
the labour market, detrimental to employees and labour unions.  
Secondly, displaced and actual production might rely on very different production 
functions, as a result of a selection process: surviving firms may well be different from 
the ones having disappeared, while maintained production units may be very different 
from the ones relocated abroad within the same firms. Hence considering the production 
function of the survivors will lead to an underestimation of the impact of trade on 
employment.  
Lastly, productivity gains can hardly be considered as exogenous: the reason why 
productivity gains are large in import competing sectors is the combination of defensive 
innovation and firm or products selection effects. 
What would be the impact of relaxing such assumptions is difficult to assess. Intra-
Industry Trade is not really an issue when trade between advanced and developed 
economies is at stake. The second assumption is on the contrary key to any 
assessment of the trade impact on the labour market, as stressed by Wood (1994). 
Lastly, the empirical magnitude of defensive innovation cannot be assessed. Still, not all 
trade of economies such as the US takes place with developing economies and if the 
total impact of trade is limited, the impact of trade with developing economies might be 
tiny; and only part of it is due to outsourcing. 
One solution adopted in the literature in order to relax the assumption on identical 
production functions of observed and displaced production is to adopt an econometric 
approach based on a simple two sectors theoretical model. Then, there is no need of 
resorting to Input Output tables. A related advantage of this strategy is that it authorises 
to identify the specific impact of trade with low wage locations. At the end, what one gets 
is an upper evaluation of the impact of outsourcing-related imports on employment since 
not all imports from low wage countries are associated with outsourcing. 
This is the approach adopted by Rowthorn & Ramaswami (1998) and Boulhol & 
Fontagné (2006). We follow the latter paper. There are two sectors in the economy, 
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industry and services. The production functions rely on labour only and integrate a total 
factor productivity term, which coincides with labour productivity in this simplified case. 
TFP is supposed to be growing at a different and exogenous rate in industry and in 
services. Relative labour productivity and relative prices simply derive from these 
assumptions under perfect competition. On the demand side, utility is supposed to be 
CES between industrial goods and services. Therefore, relative demand at constant 
income simply verify a log-linear relationship with relative prices, subject to the elasticity 
of substitution, while relative employment is determined by relative productivity and the 
elasticity of substitution. The latter elasticity  accordingly plays a key role in the 
deindustrialisation. With elasticity lower than unity, as confirmed by the data, the 
substitution between industrial goods and services will not be large enough to 
compensate the decrease in the relative price resulting from higher productivity gains in 
the industry. Consequently, the share of industry in the labour force is driven towards 
zero by relative productivity gains. Still, income is not constant, and this counterbalances 
at least partially the mechanical effect identified here. However, the income elasticity of 
goods and services follows an extended Engel’s law according to which, the relative 
consumption (in volume terms) of manufactured products necessarily decrease from a 
certain level of development. In other words, at constant relative prices, the relative 
demand for industrial goods will follow a hump shape based on the level of 
development. To take this into account, Boulhol & Fontagné introduce real GDP per 
capita and income per capita in the relative demand equation. At constant prices, the 
relative value-added of industry in volume terms increases until a certain level of per 
capita income, before diminishing subsequently.  
Then the questions are: how did net trade impact such outcomes? Did outsourcing and 
more generally trade with low wage economies have a specific impact? Can we give a 
rough figure of jobs displaced by trade with low wage economies? Such approach 
provides an upper cap regarding the effects of net trade with low wage economies, after 
controlling for productivity and shifts in domestic preferences. The econometric 
specification relies on a dynamic panel for 16 OECD countries over 1970-2002 using 
yearly data. It explains the share of manufacturing in total employment using as 
determinants income per capita and squared income per capita, net trade balance and 
imports from low wage economies (including new EU member states), investment and 
an exogenous TFP term. It is estimated in first differences using GMM. Based on these 
estimates Boulhol & Fontagné compute the changes in the manufacturing employment 
share induced by the changes in explanatory variables, as well as the total contribution 
of trade with low wage economies. The contribution of trade with these economies 
explains on average 19.8% of the observed decline in the manufacturing employment 
share. The magnitude of such an effect varies largely from one country to another, but 
Spain is just in the average (19.5%).  
3. OUTSOURCING, WAGES AND TRADE IN INPUTS. 
To better understand what are the specific channels through which outsourcing is 
actually impacting the labour market, let’s start with a puzzle. Consider the classical 
2x2x2 international trade framework, with North and South being the two countries and 
skilled and unskilled the two primary factors. Other classical assumptions hold. In the 
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North, trade with South reduces the price of (imported) non-qualified labour intensive 
goods; hence real wages of blue collar workers should decrease, and reciprocally for 
white collar workers intensively used in exports. 
Since factors are substitutable, exporting a.w.a. import-competing industries should 
substitute unskilled for skilled workers. This is the well-known “Stolper-Samuelson” 
theorem. The problem is that this theoretical result is at odds with facts. While increasing 
inequalities are indeed observed, factor substitution goes the other way round: there is 
substitution of skilled for unskilled workers. In total, since relative wages and relative 
employment of skilled workers increase, one is facing a shift of the relative demand 
curve and not a move along this curve. How to explain this has been the source of 
debates during a decade. 
Two alternative channels may be envisaged. Firstly, a composition effect might play. 
The output of the skill-intensive sectors has risen, relative to those of unskilled ones. 
Alternatively, one may observe an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour 
within the manufacturing industries, and this second channel actually played a key role.  
Thus, how to justify such increase in the relative demand for skilled labour within the 
manufacturing industries? There are four candidate explanations. Firstly, the literature of 
the early 90s put emphasis on the existence of a biased exogenous technical progress 
(Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993 - Krugman and Lawrence, 1994). On the contrary, the 
literature of the early 2000s was very much in favour of a biased endogenous technical 
progress (Thoenig and Verdier, 2002 – Neary, 2002). The third and contemporary strand 
of literature favouring selection effects may also be mobilised: only the most productive 
firms or products survive and these are the more skill intensive ones (Melitz, 2003 - 
Eaton, Kortum & Kramarz, 2005 – Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2006). We will focus in 
the following on the fourth explanation, pointing to the role of trade in intermediate inputs 
in the rising wage inequalities between skill and  unskilled labour (Feenstra and Hanson, 
1996 - Anderton and Brenton, 1999 - Strauss-Kahn, 2003 – Hijzen et al., 2003). 
The basic intuition is simple. In a classical setting with three factors (capital and the two 
categories of labour) and two intermediate goods combining in a final good at zero 
assembly cost, the possibility to import one intermediate good firstly authorises to 
increase domestic GDP. The seminal result of Casas (1973) according to which there is 
a gain to trade in intermediate goods. What is new and has been demonstrated by 
Feenstra and Hanson is different: with globalisation and the possibility to rely on 
increasingly “different” (in terms of comparative advantage) trading partners, there is a 
drop in the price of the imported intermediate good. Hence, outsourcing (meaning here 
importing intermediate goods formerly domestically produced), will shift domestic 
production in the North towards the skill intensive production segment. And once again, 
final output increases: this is the specific gain to outsourcing. Then, using the Jones’ 
algebra, it is easy to check that the change in the price of the final good is a weighted 
average of the change in the price of the two intermediate goods. Since the price of the 
imported inputs decrease, this means that outsourcing turns into a relative increase in 
the price of the final good vis-a-vis the imported inputs. 
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Using this relationship between outsourcing and relative prices to measure the impact of 
the latter on the changes in the cost shares of skilled labour, Feenstra and Hanson 
proxy the skilled wage by the “non-production wage” and use a translog cost function. 
The first derivatives with respect to factor prices give the cost shares. So the last step is 
to choose proxies for the prices of inputs: the price of capital equipment and the share of 
outsourcing in intermediate consumption. As for the latter, they rely on an Input-Output 
table to compute the share of imported inputs in intermediate consumption, restricting 
the origin of imports to low wage locations, and possibly restricting to diagonal of the 
Input-Output table. Depending on the measure of capital, outsourcing has or not a larger 
contribution than investment (technical progress) in the rise of inequalities. But more 
interestingly, the magnitude of the contribution of outsourcing to the 1979-1990 change 
in the non-production wage share in US manufacturing ranges between 15% and 24%. 
This result has been reproduced for the UK and for France with results broadly in line 
with such estimates. 
From a policy perspective, the ultimate impact of outsourcing in a general equilibrium 
framework where different activities may have different propensity to outsource has 
been tentatively addressed by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). As a result of 
outsourcing, they argue that trade in goods has been replaced by trade in tasks. Firms 
offshore tasks relying more on routine or unskilled jobs. Offshored tasks are less costly 
and the possibility to reduce their cost can be viewed as an unskilled-labour augmenting 
technical progress. Here, globalisation is pictured as a reduction in costs to outsourcing 
offering new opportunities to offshore  tasks. This increases productivity in sectors that 
outsource part of their unskilled activities. The wage bill is accordingly reduced in 
proportion of the quantity of unskilled labour employed in the different industries, to the 
benefit of the less skill intensive activities. This boosts the demand for the products of 
the latter and hence for employment of blue collar workers. By the same token, this puts 
an upward pressure on the unskilled wage possibly compensating the expected 
negative impact of outsourcing. How much this productivity effect actually 
“compensates” remains an open empirical question, still unclear to the best of our 
knowledge. 
To conclude, we have seen that while the direct impact of trade with low wage 
economies on the labour market is limited in terms of jobs, the impact of outsourcing 
unskilled activities on inequalities is not negligible. Beyond outsourcing, the question 
raised by the competition with low wage economies is whether the breakdown of the 
value added chain will leave any manufacturing activity located in the North. What we 
called the “Nike model” above might well become the standard organisation of activities 
in the industrial sector. Accordingly, manufacturing companies in the North would 
become essentially service providers, designing, marketing and distributing products 
manufactured in low wage economies. After at least one decade of outsourcing, it is 
worth considering the changes in the international division of labour at the most detailed 
level in order to assess the emergence or not of such scheme. This is done in the next 
section. 
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4. HIGH AND LOW WAGES LOCATIONS DO NOT COMPETE HEAD ON. 
The emergence of low wage new competitors has deeply affected world trade patterns 
since the mid 90s. To shed light on this, we will proceed with a detailed analysis using 
BACI, a new database developed by the CEPII  and authorising to tackle  specialisation 
at the most detailed level for all countries and products. We decided to exclude intra-EU 
trade and we use the HS6 classification of goods comprising some 5,000 different 
categories of products. We consider the 1995-2005 period. 
First of all, the evidence of large swings in the international division of labour is provided 
by the computation of world trade margins. Observed changes in the value of exports by 
product, exporter and destination market are the result of entries and exits and we can 
define the intensive margin of trade as the change in the value of trade flows that are 
present continuously over the decade. On the contrary, the extensive margin of trade 
can be defined as the net change in the number of trade flows or in the value of newly 
created trade flows.  
Based on this definition, Cheptea et al. (2008) find that the observed USD 4,117 bn 
increase in world trade (excluding intra-EU 25 trade) can be decomposed into three 
terms. Firstly, the 4,093,818 individual trade flows existing in 1995 have increased their 
value by USD 3,361 bn. Secondly, during the same period, 30.6% of the individual trade 
flows have disappeared. Thirdly, 3,892,662 new trade flows appeared meaning that 
these entries correspond to 95.1% of the number of initial trade flows. In total, only 
42.2% of trade flows recorded in 2005 were present in 1995. 
Notwithstanding this rapid turnover, the shaping of the international division of labour 
has kept room for high income economies, in particular EU member states. The bottom 
line here is that international specialisation is taking place within products, across 
varieties, rather than across products. This is outcome is now well documented in the 
literature. Schott (2004) shows that US imports exhibit a large variance in unit values 
(values divided by quantities) within product categories, and that US bundles of imported 
goods, at the bilateral level, are at odds with the prediction of the multicone factor 
proportion model where different countries should specialise in different  bundle of  
goods.  Hummels and Klenow (2005) show that large countries do export higher quality 
goods, a pattern that is confirmed by Fontagné et al. (2008): advanced economies 
specialise in top range varieties, and low wage economies in the low range of the same 
industries. According to Fontagné et al., on average, Japanese unit values are 1.43 
times higher than for Brazil, 1.80 times higher than for India, 2.89 times higher than for 
China, for the same products, shipped to the same markets, within the same year 
(2004). Similarly, US export unit values are 1.55 times higher than for India and 2.44 
times higher than for China. 
Also, a glance at the data proves that the share of up-market varieties in US imports 
from each exporter is a positive function of the development level of the exporter. 
Against this background, it is worth noticing that the EU is on average mostly specialised 
in the upper segment of the market. Also, EU world market shares are highly resilient in 
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the upper segment of the market, contrasting with Japan or the US (Table 1). Lastly, we 
also observe that EU 25 records better performances than EU15 and this may be 
interpreted as the benefit of intra-EU outsourcing or more broadly intra-EU 
manufacturing relocation (Table 2). 
 
Table 1- Change in the 10 largest world market shares of EU Member States (p.p. change, 
1995-2004) 
Source: Cheptea et al. (2008). 
 
Table 2- 1995-2005 change in world market shares:  EU and selected competitors  
 
Source: Cheptea et al. (2008). 
 
 
Low-m arket Up-market
M arket share p .p. change M arket share p.p. change
Exporter 2004
(% )
1995-2004 2004
(% )
1995-2004
EU 25 15.3 -2.27 30.0 0 .40
USA 12.1 -4.42 14.4 -3 .47
Japan 7.2 -2.55 14.1 -4 .45
Asean 8.7 -1.16 8.7 1 .43
Korea 4 .8 0.20 4.4 0 .47
China 19.5 10.56 4.1 2 .42
India 2 .2 0.82 0.8 0 .36
Russia 1 .5 0.45 0.8 0 .47
Brazil 2 .0 0.32 0.8 0 .01
Market share,
in value
(USD)
p.p. change in
market share
in value
Country 2005 1995-2005
EU 25 19.5 -1.3
EU 15 18.4 -1.8
USA 13.0 -4.4
Japan 9.5 -4.1
China 14.1 8.4
Korea 4.3 0.7
India 1.5 0.4
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These results suggest that high and low income countries are, contrary to the common 
perception, not competing head on within industries. In particular Europe has so far 
managed to reshape its manufacturing sector by combining up-market products and 
lower cost locations. Would such pattern be resilient, it would be an original model as 
compared to the US or Japan. 
5. CONCLUSION. 
Contrasting with the fears raised by outsourcing, trade has on the whole had a limited 
impact on domestic employment in the North, as shown by input-output and econometric 
analyses of labour content. The same conclusion must be raised for outsourcing. Still, 
the new patterns of the international division of labour have had a clear-cut impact on 
the labour market. The splitting up of the value added chain and the associated 
outsourcing have had an impact similar to a biased technical progress. They have 
increased the relative demand for skilled labour.  
Such outcome of outsourcing strategies is however only part of a more general shift of 
the international division of labour making it possible to countries at very different level 
of development to increasingly trade on a mutually profitable basis. This shift leads 
advanced economies to upgrade their exports, a strategy that has been particularly 
successful in Europe. All in all, the impact on the labour market of such move to quality 
might however be important: it is associated with a profound reshaping of activities, 
portfolio of products and organisation within firms, and this is potentially detrimental not 
only to less skilled workers, but also, within skill levels to the less adaptable ones. 
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